Discriminating to learn to discriminate by Hauk, Esther
Working Paper 97-61 
Economics Series 31 
September 1997 
Departamento de Economia 
U niversidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-98-75 
DISCRIMINATING TO LEARN TO DISCRIMINATE* 
Esther Hauk t 
Abstract 
Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames 
reveal that many hypotheses used in the literature to explain cooperation are wrong. In particular 
the existence of player types is rejected as well as over-simplified behavioural postulates which 
allow for the existence of agents who make consistent errors. Experimental subjects turn out to 
permanently search for a better strategy. It is further suggested that the freedom to choose whether 
or not to play the prisoner's dilemma might be a key element in explaining observed cooperation 
levels in real data. 
Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma; Cooperation; Exit; Experiments; Learning. 
t Hauk, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, e-mail: 
ehauk@eco.uc3m.es. 
* I thank Antoni Bosch, Jordi Brandts, Alan Kirrnan, Albert Marcet, Ramon Marimon and 
Rosemarie Nagel for helpful discussions. Financial support from a Human Capital grant to the 
ASSET network is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Maria Saez for correcting my Spanish 
and to Enriqueta Aragones, Xavier Cuadras, Nir Dagan, Carlo Devillanova, Fernando Guirao, 
Sjaak Hurkens and Rosemarie Nagel for taking part in a pilot experiment. 
Discriminating to Learn to Discriminate* 
Esther Hauk 
Department of Economics 
U niversidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid 126 
E-28903 Getafe (Spain) 
e-mail: ehauk@eco.uc3m.es 
September 2, 1997 
first version: June 1996 
Abstract 
Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma 
supergames reveal that many hypotheses used in the literature to explain cooper-
ation are wrong. In particular the existence of player types is rejected as well as 
over-simplified behavioural postulates which allow for the existence of agents who 
make consistent errors. Experimental subjects turn out to permanently search for 
a better strategy. It is further suggested that the freedom to choose whether or 
not to play the prisoner's dilemma might be a key element in explaining observed 
cooperation levels in real data. 
Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, exit, experiments, learning 
JEL classification numbers: C14, C72, C78, C91 
*1 thank Antoni Bosch, Jordi Brandts, Alan Kirman, Albert Marcet, Ramon Marimon and Rosemarie 
Nagel for helpful discussions. Financial support from a Human Capital grant to the ASSET network is 
gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Maria Saez for correcting my Spanish and to EnriquetaAragones, 
Xavier Cuadras, Nir Dagan, Carlo Devillanova, Fernando Guirao, Sjaak Hurkens and Rosemarie Nagel 
for taking part in a pilot experiment. 
1 Introd uction . 
The Prisoner's dilemma game has been taken to the experimental laboratory well above 
1000 times (see Sally (1995) for an overview). Its characteristic tension between the Pareto 
superiority of cooperation and the strict dominance of defection promises an interesting 
study of human behaviour. The game, indeed, deserves special attention since it formalizes 
many experiences of everyday life. Situations of friendship formation, information sharing, 
joint research, selling and buying among others can all be modeled by this simple game. 
The standard prediction that defection is the only rational outcome in the finite version 
of the game leaves a feeling of unease: it cannot be reconciled with observed cooperation 
levels. Controlled experiments have tried to nail down reasons for cooperation or the 
failure to cooperate. Many different explanations have been put forward, reaching from 
framing and presentation effects! to postulates on the way how human beings are, reason 
and learn. E.g. persistent cooperation in one-shot experiments are often seen as evidence 
for the existence of intrinsic cooperative types. How well-founded are these explanations? 
Do existing experiments capture all aspects that might be important for cooperation? 
The above examples of everyday prisoner's dilemmas reveal that human beings often 
play several such games simultaneously in the same time interval and that many of these 
games have a voluntary interaction structure. E.g. I can choose my friends or co-authors. 
Partner selection is a strategic choice and might therefore influence the outcome of the 
game. 
In the last years, several theoretical papers have examined the influence of partner se-
lection on cooperation levels2 • Those papers confirm the strategic importance of partner 
selection and how it relates to cooperation; however, the extent to which cooperation is 
enhanced depends in a sensitive way on the model specifications and behavioural assump-
tions. The great majority of papers use finite automata to model behaviour within the 
prisoner's dilemma and some even use inbuilt stopping rules (e.g. if your game partner 
defects never interact with him again) to model partner selection. Thereby they implicitly 
assume the existence of player types who treat (identical) opponents with the same his-
tory of play in exactly the same way. Is it reasonable to assume that such types do indeed 
exist? The evidence experimental results have presented so far rests on shaky grounds 
since there are no experiments which allow subjects to play simultaneously with several 
players the two-person prisoner's dilemma game. Only if in a multiple game situation 
subjects choose the same strategy with identical opponents will the hypothesis of the 
le.g. the words chosen to instruct experimental subjects might encourage cooperation. 
2these papers include among others Ashlock et al. (1996), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Morikawa et al. 
(1995) and (1996), Orbell and Dawes (1991), Peck (1993), Schluessler (1989), Smucker et al. (1994), 
Stanley et al. (1994), Tesfatsion (1995), Hauk (1997) 
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existence of "fixed" player types be well-founded. 
The present paper addresses two different but related issues: (i) is the assumption of 
player types justified? (ii) It examines partner selection in an environment without any 
ex-ante stopping rules or ex-ante player types. For this purpose three sets of experiments 
are conducted. In each setup every experimental subject plays 10 supergames of a 10 
period finitely repeated two person prisoner's dilemma with 6 other subjects simultane-
ously. I.e. in every period each subject plays 6 prisoner's dilemma ,games, choosing one 
strategy for each opponent. Partner selection is modeled in the form of an outside option 
with zero payoff which results from the subjects' conscious decision not to enter (which is 
equivalent to exiting) a period of a game. The experimental setups differ in whether exit 
is possible and in the relative payoff this exit option yields. In the basic setup there is no 
partner selection. In the second setup the payoff from exiting is better than the mutual 
defection payoff3 and in the third setup the payoff from exiting is worse. 
The observations on individual behaviour in multiple game situations are very illu-
minating. They strongly reject the existence of player types: most subjects are not co-
operatively or defectively inclined but use different types of behaviour against opponents 
with an identical history of play, i.e. they discriminate among equals. Discrimination is 
both common among subjects and persistent over time. This result seriously questions 
any type-dependent theoretical work and can affect strongly the learning dynamics in the 
game. 
Indeed, discrimination leads to a very different cooperation patterns than the ones 
usually observed in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments (see e.g. Roth et 
al. (1978), Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Andreoni and Miller (1993)). Cooperation 
levels which normally tend to fall in early supergames rise immediately in the multiple 
game experiment. Both cooperation and endeffect behaviour4 are learned sooner. Dis-
crimination might seem arbitrary but has some optimal properties. This happens because 
experimental subjects are all the time experimenting with the different available strategies 
and thereby quickly learn which ones perform better. Discrimination serves as a way to 
resolve the intrinsic tension of the prisoner's dilemma between the Pareto superiority of 
cooperation and the strict dominance of defection. Two things have to be achieved: (i) 
cooperation (ii) at the minimal cost. Discrimination helps to spread the risk involved in 
cooperative attempts. Experimental subjects function like classifier systems: the same 
initial situation triggers different behavioural rules, with more successful rules being re-
inforced over time. 
Experimental subjects behave in a very clever sophisticated manner, although they 
3Therefore, I sometimes refer to this setup as "better". 
4see Section 3 Def. 1 
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are left free to do anything. This implies that theorists have to be very careful which 
behavioural rules they impose on their economic agents. It is not reasonable to assume 
any rule. The experiment confirms the commonly shared belief among economists that 
human beings are not stupid and do not make consistent errors for ever. 
Concerning partner selection, the experiment confirms that voluntary interactions 
favour the Pareto superior outcome. In both experimental setups partner selection clearly 
enhances cooperation5 although the strategic role of the outside option is very distinct. 
In setup III exiting serves to sustain cooperation by constituting a harder punishment for 
defection than defection itself. In the experiment this non-subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium shows some strength. Moreover, exiting in early periods of a supergame is used as a 
less costly way than immediate cooperation to signal cooperative intentions. In setup Il 
exiting constitutes the subgame perfect equilibrium path. However, complete inactivity 
is hardly ever observed. Players quickly learn to cooperate and become very efficient in 
excluding defectors. 
Observed behaviour in the final period of setup Il corroborates our hypothesis that 
experimental subjects function like classifier systems. An instance of not learning by not 
doing occurs. A considerable proportion of experimental subjects fails to learn to exit in 
the last period of a supergame6 . Last period entry usually happens only with a limited 
number of game partners. Since last period entry only leads to a game if both opponents 
enter, in the majority of cases no game occurs and the negative consequences oflast period 
entry do not arise. Having no consequence, last period entry is neither discouraged nor 
reinforced. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the experimen-
tal setup is explained and justified. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the hypotheses, test them 
and discuss the results. Section 5 describes last period entry in setup Il (not learning by 
not doing). The final section concludes. 
2 Experimental setup 
2.1 The underlying game 
The experiments are based on the two person repeated prisoner's dilemma with the fol-
lowing bimatrix of the one-shot game. 
SIn the literature, the payoff structure of setup II has been examined for the one-shot game. Even in 
the one-shot game, experiments found that cooperation levels increased. (Orbell and Dawes (1993) for 
the 2-person case and Orbell, Schartz-Shea and Simmons (1984) for the n-person prisoner's dilemma.) 
6Last period play can only lead to defection. 
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During the experiment defection was coded by a and cooperation by b. The =F entry 
for mutual defection represents the two payoff matrices used in the different experiments. 
The negative entry was used in the baseline experiment and in setup Il, while setup III 
used the positive entry. 
2.2 The baseline experiment 
The baseline experiment (treatment I) concentrates on replicating the multiplicity of 
human activity. For this purpose the repeated prisoner's dilemma (without exit) was 
played in 6 parallel partnerships. 7 subjects were used, since 6 partnerships seems to be 
few enough to keep track of every individual match, and a big enough number to allow 
for experimentation and a wide experience in a short time period. Subjects did not have 
to commit to a supergame strategy before beginning to play nor were they forced to use 
the same strategy against everybody. In other words, when deciding how to play against 
two players with the same history, they could choose to defect against one and cooperate 
with the other. This freedom of choice allows us to test for the existence of fixed player 
types. 
Treatment I is called baseline experiment since it only addresses one of the two issues 
to be examined and since - concerning the second issue (partner selection) - it additionally 
serves as a basis for comparison with experimental setup Il. 
2.3 Further experimental treatments 
The two remaining experimental setups model voluntary interactions. Partner selection 
takes place in form of a conscious choice whether or not to play with a certain subject. 
Each period of a supergame has two stages: the matching stage, in which subjects express 
their willingness to get matched; and the game stage, in which matched pairs play the 
prisoner's dilemma. Not playing is equivalent to zero points. 
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Two treatments are examined using the negative and positive payoff entry for mutual 
defection respectively. The different payoff matrices affect the Nash equilibria of the 
model. In the first case (treatment Il) the existence of the outside option shifts the only 
game theoretic (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the finitely repeated game from always 
defect to never play. Hence, if subjects play, they prefer the prisoner's dilemma over the 
safe outside option. 
The second case (treatment Ill) has the same subgame perfect equilibrium as the 
baseline experiment, namely always defect, although this outcome is now positive in terms 
of payoffs. This changes the underlying incentive structure because subgame perfect play 
does no longer lead to losses but to a small but secure reward. Therefore treatment III 
does not allow for a direct comparison with treatment I. Treatment III is interesting in 
its own right, because it adds an outside option which is irrelevant for subgame perfect 
play since it is weakly dominated. One might therefore expect that experimental subjects 
will not use this option given that it is worse than the equilibrium payoff. However, the 
outside option adds an additional punishment for defection that is harder than defection 
itself. The non-credible background threat of exiting leads to the existence offurther (non 
subgame perfect) N ash equilibria. Two of them are of special interest 7: 
1. mutual cooperation until period 9, in which both players switch to defectionS. 
2. as before but exit in the first period of a supergame in order to signal cooperative 
intentions. 
In both cases, defection before period 9 is punished via eternal exit. This punishment 
threat is not credible, since once defection has occurred reoptimization dictates to continue 
the game and to defect. 
Treatment III serves to examine whether an "irrelevant" outside option nevertheless 
has some positive effects on cooperation levels. This would be the case if evidence for the 
above-mentioned non subgame perfect Nash equilibria could be found. This would be a 
very strong argument that the freedom whether or not to play to prisoner's dilemma is a 
key element in explaining observed cooperation levels in real data. 
Table I summarizes the differences in the experimental setups. 
7There are other Nash equilibria, which are not interesting for the problem under examination. E.g. 
exiting in every period is a Nash equilibrium, although it is weakly dominated. 
SLet h represent the payoff achieved when defecting against a cooperator. d refers to the mutual 
defection payoff, c to the payoff received from mutual cooperation and 1 to the payoff resulting from 
cooperating against a defector. The incentive constraint is that ne cooperative periods followed by 
mutual defection lead to a higher payoff than betraying the partner followed by being exited against 
forever. Formally, neC + (10 - ne)d ~ h + (ne - l)c, which is fulfilled as long as ne ~ 9 given the payoff 
matrix used. 
5 
payoff from 
setup exit mutual defection SPE further NE 
I no -1 always defect none 
11 yes -1 exit none 
III yes +1 always defect yes 
Table I 
In all setups no restrictions on the strategy choice were made given the available 
options. 
2.4 Matching mechanism 
A match occurs if and only if two players have both explicitly stated their wish to interact. 
If only one person enters, no match occurs. Matches are reconsidered every period. 
This simple matching mechanism isolates past behaviour and expectations as the 
causes of exiting. If the number of game offers and games were restricted exogenously, the 
non-occurrence of a match would no longer reveal a clear preference against this particular 
match, but could be due to capacity constraints. This would distort the effects of the exit 
option on the amount of cooperation. 
2.5 Information 
In each supergame every player is identified by a player number. This number remains 
the same during the supergame but changes when a new supergame begins. Throughout 
the experiment, players are able to look back into the history of all past supergames. This 
does not enable them to deduce a player's past identity but allows them to learn how to 
react to some reoccurring behaviour patterns. 
Players will only be communicated whether a match occurred, but not the decision 
of the opponent. This implies that if player A said no to player B, player A will be 
communicated that he is not matched with B, but he will not know whether B wanted 
to be matched with him or not. Clearly, if B wanted to be matched with A, no match 
implicitly reveals to B that A did not want the match. 
Players will only be told their own total payoff. They will be communicated their 
own score from each individual match as well as the opponent's score and action. The 
latter two pieces of information can be deduced form the payoff matrix and are hence 
redundant. 
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2.6 The end 
Each supergame ends after 10 periods, which is known by the subjects. 
Each experimental session consists of 10 supergames involving the same set of players. 
2.7 Payment 
Since some of the points in the prisoner's dilemma games are negative, players were given 
a starting capital of 1000 Pesetas. It was guaranteed to them that they did not have 
to give any money to the experimenter should they go bankrupt, which never happened. 
Points achieved in supergames were scaled by 15 when converted into Pesetas. Con-
sequently, payoff incentives were very high in each supergame, as every player had 60 
possible interactions9• Hence, in expected terms, every single decision mattered. As one 
experimental session consisted of 600 possible interactions, not every supergame could be 
paid using the before-mentioned desirable incentive structure. In order to ensure that 
subjects tried to do their best in every supergame, subjects were told that two randomly 
determined supergames will be paid. At the end of the experiment every subject was 
asked to draw once out of two urns. One urn contained supergames 1 to 5, the other urn 
contained supergames 6 to 10. Consequently, every supergame had equal probability to 
be paid. The subdivision into two groups rewarded for learning effects by guaranteeing 
the payment of some supergame in which learning could have occurred. 
2.8 Experimental subjects and sessions 
The subject pool consisted of students at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona. They 
were either economists or business administration students in their first semester or stu-
dents of humanities. Subjects were allowed to take part in only one experimental session 
and in only one experimental setup. The experiments were done in a period of two weeks. 
The baseline experiment lasted two hours, while the second and third treatment required 
3 hours each. The experiments were conducted in a computerized laboratory and were 
programmed in C++. At the end of every experimental session subjects gave written 
reasons for their overall decisions. For every single experimental setup, three experimen-
tal sessions took place. Unfortunately in the last session, which was using the baseline 
experiment, the network broke down, hence the session could not be completed lO • 
910 periods with each of the six other subjects. 
1°1 only used available data to derive the experimental results, although the subjects' comments were 
detailed enough to simulate the continuation of the game. I decided not to do so, since experimental 
subjects did not behave 100% according to their own description. 
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3 Results I: the multiple game situation 
The outcomes of the multiple game experiment strongly reject the existence of player 
types. At the same time they present a puzzle. 
Observation 1 experimental subjects discriminate among equals, i. e. they use different 
strategies against partners with an identical history of play. 
Observation 2 Discrimination pays: compared to standard experiments learning is faster. 
The puzzle consists in that some apparently arbitrary way of behaviour (discrimination 
among equals) has some optimal properties. Before trying to resolve this puzzle some 
evidence for its occurrence will be shown. 
Evidence for observation 1 
In order to present evidence for observation 1 two types of discriminatory behaviour 
will be distinguished: (i) discriminating in initial periods of a supergame will be referred 
to as divergence. A player converges if he stops using diverse initial behaviour over the 
supergames. (ii) A player is said to be mixing if he reacts differently towards identical 
partners within the same supergame, i.e. if he discriminates among equals from period 2 
of a supergame onwardsll . 
Both completely unexperienced subjects and more experienced subjects discriminate. 
Divergence in the first period of the first supergame is the rule rather than the exception. ~ 
of all experimental subjects diverged (~~ in setup I, ~~ in setup II and ~~ in setup Ill). The 
binomial test rejects the hypothesis of equal probabilities of pure and diverging natural 
inclinations at a significance level which is basically zero12. This observation extends far 
beyond first encounters. Divergence and mixing behaviour does not disappear over time. 
l of the subjects do not converge, while :1 continue mixing (for details see appendix C). 
Moreover, there is no clear correlation between the proportion of subjects that diverged 
(mixed) in each supergame and the number of the supergame. Only setup II supports 
the hypothesis of falling mixing behaviour and falling divergence with increasing number 
of supergames. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficients r and their significance 
level Cl( are summarized in Table n. 
11 From period 2 onwards some individual reputation exists. 
12 All test statistics used are explained in appendix A. 
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mixing divergence 
setup r a r a 
I -0.755 0.01 -0.318 insignificant 
11 -0.91 0.0005 -0.831 0.0025 
III 0.311 insignificant 0.25 insignificant 
Table 11 
Apart from most coefficients being insignificant, some of them even have the wrong 
sign. Discrimination among equals is a persistent phenomenon. 
Evidence for observation 2 
To see that this seemingly arbitrary way of behaviour has nevertheless some optimal 
properties the multiple game situation has to be compared to standard experiments in 
which one supergame is played at a time. Figure 1 (see appendix B1 for underlying data) 
shows that percentage cooperation 13 in the present experiments, averaged over sessions, 
do not follow the typical well-known pattern as e.g. explained by Roth et al. (1978): in 
the typical pattern some cooperation occurs during the first supergame, but the strict 
dominance of defection immediately takes over. The possibility of reaching the Pareto 
superior outcome is noticed later and learned slowly. Consequently, cooperation levels fall 
in the second supergame and require several supergames before reaching and overtaking 
the original level of the first supergame14 • 
Figure 1 illustrates that in the multiple game situation there is no drastic drop in co-
operation levels in the second supergame. On the contrary, cooperation levels are either 
stable or increase immediately. This immediate increase in cooperation levels is mainly 
due to successful cooperative encounters. In all experimental setups the number of co-
operative relationships15 per subject is higher in supergame 2 than in 1, and increases 
further over several supergames (see appendix B3 and figure 3). Experimental subjects 
quickly learn not to waste their cooperative efforts. They cooperate if they find coop-
eration. In other words they cooperate only if cooperation pays. This is also confirmed 
by the development of always defective play in the setups (I and Ill) in which defection 
is subgame perfect. Although overall defection levels hardly increase or do not increase 
at all (see Figure 1), the number of defective relationships per subject increases heavily 
13These are measured in average percentage (one-sided) cooperation levels. When the outside option 
exists, cooperation levels are conditional on mutual entry. 
14E.g. in Selten and Stoecker (1986) it requires 12 supergames till cooperation is learned. 
15A parnetship is COOPERATIVE (Selten and Stoecker (1986)) if both players choose the cooperative 
alternative at least during 4 subsequent periods. 
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Figure 1: 
from supergame 1 to 2. Figure 2 shows the percentage of (one-sided and mutual) al-
ways defective play in the different supergames (for underlying data see Appendix D). 
The pattern of always defective relationships implies that subjects learn to penalize de-
fectors immediately. Given that at the same time subjects do increase their successful 
cooperative encounters, the incentives to move away from purely defective play are high. 
This explains the steady reduction in the number of always defective relationships over 
supergames. 
Endeffect behaviour16 shows a further striking difference with" standard" experiments. 
Endeffect play arises nearly simultaneously with mutual cooperation while in standard 
experiments cooperation is learned before endeffect play is understood. In the present 
experiments endeffect play spreads fast, since one subject's understanding is sufficient to 
affect everybody else. Often a chain reaction is observed. Endeffect play by one partner 
16Endeffect behaviour (play) is defined as follows: 
Def. 1 The play of a supergame is called END-EFFECT PLAY (Selten and Stoecker (1986)) if 
1. both players choose the cooperative alternative in at least four consecutive periods k, .... , m. 
2. In period m + 1 for m < 10 at least one player chooses the non-cooperative alternative. 
S. In all periods m + 2 - if there are any - both players choose the noncooperative alternative 
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provokes endeffect play with others. A detailed characterization of endeffect periods and 
the immediate shift of the endeffect to earlier periods can be found in appendix E. 
The puzzle resolved 
Discrimination pays in all three setups since it is a sophisticated way to experiment 
with reasonable available strategies which allows for quick learning. The finitely repeated 
prisoner's dilemma is characterized by its fundamental tension between the Pareto su-
periority of cooperation and the strict dominance of defection. Mutual cooperation is 
desirable but making a cooperative move is risky and might be costly. Mixing and diver-
gence are used because they are a way to resolve this tension, to spread the risk involved 
in cooperation, and to search for the right balance between the two conflicting forces. 
Experimental subjects are not of a specific fixed player type but function like a classifier 
system, in which the same initial situation can trigger a variety of behavioural rules. The 
probability of each rule being triggered is updated via reinforcement learning: rules yield-
ing a higher payoff become more likely over time17 Mixing and divergence simply serve to 
17Roth and Erev (1995a,b) have successfully simulated observed behaviour in several experiments on 
extensive form games and on repeated games whose strategy set can be restricted to the stage game 
actions using a simple model of reinforcement learning. Their model cannot be applied in the present 
context since our experimental subjects can use different stage game actions in the same supergame. 
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gather as much experience as possible within the same supergame in order to discover an 
optimal strategy. Experimental subjects learn in a sophisticated clever manner. 
Observation 3 confirms that mixing and divergence have the same origin. 
Observation 3 A player who stops mixing is very likely to converge and vice versa. 
If there was no correlation, the number of subjects who neither mix nor converge, or 
mix and diverge, and the number of subjects who either mix and converge, or do not mix 
and diverge, should be more or less equal. The binomial test rejects this null hypothesis 
in favour of the hypothesis of correlation in all three experimental setups18. 
Why does discrimination not disappear over time? Should subjects not have discovered 
the optimal strategy? What is optimal changes with what subjects have learned. Two 
things have to be learned: (i) to reach cooperation (ii) at the minimal risk and lowest 
cost. While in the early periods of discrimination (first phase) subjects try to escape 
the trap of strict dominance and learn to cooperate, in the second phase they search for 
the profits from slight exploitation without risking the break-down of cooperation. If, 
however, cooperation breaks down, they have to learn to cooperate again and return to 
the first phase of discrimination. These different phases are reflected in the following 
observations. 
1. ~ of experimental subjects show sudden jumps from one type of converging behav-
iour to the other. These switches are mainly from always cooperate (AllC) to always 
defect (AllD). Sudden jumps from AllD to AllC occurred only if the subjects had 
jumped from AllC to AllD before. 
2. 8 subjects smoothly switched from AllD to AllC convergence19 • 6 of them had made 
a sudden jump from AllC to AllD convergence earlier on. A smooth change from 
AllC to AllD convergence never happened. 
3. Falling cooperation levels are consistently observed in the last supergame in all 
experimental setups (see figure 1). 
4. In setups I and III the number of relationships in which players use the subgame 
perfect equilibrium "always defect" rises in the final supergames. At the same 
18For 21 observations the probability of observing at most as many subjects whose mixing and di-
vergence behaviour is not correlated as were observed during the experiments are P[k ::; 3] = 0.001, 
P[k::; 4] = 0.004 and P[k ::; 6] = 0.039 in the first, second and third experimental setup respectively. 
19 A smooth change means a switch in convergence behaviour via several supergames with diver-
gence, moving each supergame more towards the opposite convergence behaviour. E.g. in supergame 1 
DDDDDD, in supergame 2 DDCDCDD, in supergame 3 DDCCCCD and in supergame 4 CCCCCC. 
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time the number of cooperative relationships falls (or remains constant) in all three 
experimental setups (see Figure 2 and Appendix B3). 
Switches from AllC to AllD divergence occur when cooperation is common. Subjects 
have learned that cooperation is commonly conceived as the best outcome and try to 
maximize periods of exploitation. They believe that defecting in the first period will not 
endanger the Pareto superior cooperative outcome. However, once everybody experiments 
with the possibilhy of -slight exploitation cooperation becomes risky again and the risk is 
spread. People will only gradually return to cooperate, once they are confident that the 
others also do so. 
To summarize: in the prisoner's dilemma there is no single optimal strategy. Moreover, 
what is optimal changes with what other agents have learned. Cooperation is neither 
reached easily nor easily preserved. Experimental subjects are not of a specific fixed type 
but permanently experiment with different strategies, i.e. they are aware of the changing 
environment and are always trying to learn. This has important implications on how to 
model economic agents: one lesson can be learned by these experiments. Economic agents 
have to be sophisticated; no model denying this sophistication by making economic agents 
unaware of their own consistent errors can be any good. 
4 Results 11: Partner Selection 
This section examines the second issue of the paper: how does the freedom whether or not 
to play the prisoner's dilemma influence the outcome of the finitely repeated prisoner's 
dilemma? 
Hypothesis 1 Introducing the possibility of not playing some or all the periods of a 
finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma increases total cooperation levels. 
4.1 Baseline experiment compared to experimental setup 11 
Total cooperation levels20 (see Appendix B2) were compared in three different ways: 
(i) total cooperation levels of the single players were averaged. 
(ii) total cooperation levels of the experimental sessions were averaged over sessions. 
(iii) the overall total cooperation levels where calculated without distinguishing players 
or sessions21 . 
20 As before cooperation levels are conditional on entry. 
21 This corresponds to the cooperation rate as used in Sally (1995) who explains the influence of different 
factors on this dependent variable in his meta-analysis of experiments from 1958-1992. 
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For each of these levels the WiIcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the robust rank order 
tests were performed. For the Wilcoxon test the probability p of the null hypothesis of 
equal cooperation levels in both experimental setups is reported while for the rank order 
test the significance level a with which the alternative hypothesis of higher cooperation 
levels in setup II than in the baseline experiment is accepted is displayed. The results are 
summarized in table Ill: 
per player p=O.0262 U=-2.174 
(Wx = 79) a = 0.025 
session p=0.0116 U=-2.611 
(Wx = 75) a = 0.025 
total p=0.0045 U=-3.43 
(Wx = 71) a = 0.01 
Table III 
The probability of the Wilcoxon test corresponds to an acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis at significance level a = 0.05. 
Hypothesis 2 The percentage of mutual cooperative relationships out of active relation-
ships is higher in setup 11 than in the baseline experiment. This is due to experimental 
subjects becoming more effective in excluding game partners. 
Def. 2 A relationship is active if the individuals interact in at least 5 periods'22 during 
a super game. 
Let the null hypothesis Ho be that the number of active relationships is the same 
in the two experimental setups. The alternative hypothesis Hl is that the number of 
active relationships is higher when the outside option is the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test attributes probability p = 0.0093 to Ho against Hl at 
significance level a = 0.05. The robust rank order test also accepts Hl at significance 
level a = 0.01. To test the second part of hypothesis 2 we have to show 
1. experimental subjects become more efficient in excluding defectors. 
2. disregarding partner exclusion, the percentage of cooperative relationships in the 
second experimental setup lies below the baseline experiment after a certain su-
pergame. 
225 periods are chosen because a cooperative relationship requires at least 4 periods of mutual cooper-
ation. Moreover, 5 happens to be half of the periods of a supergame. 
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To show the first statement we calculate the Spearman rank order coefficient which 
relates the number of the supergame with the percentage of defective play that occurs in 
the supergame. Including all three experimental sessions the coefficient is r = -0.766. As 
required, it is negatively significant at Cl( = 0.01 (one-tailed test). The second statement 
is proven by graphical inspection. Figure 3 shows that it holds after supergame 4. 
% of cooperative relationships 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
0,6 
0,5 
0,4 
0,3 
0,2 _____ 
O'l~ 
o +I-----+-----+-----r----~----_r----~----~----~----~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
---baseline --0-- setup II -+- II inclusive all 
Figure 3: 
4.2 Cooperation in experimental setup III 
For reasons which will be explained in detail below and were already hinted at in Sec-
tion 2.3, setup III cannot simply be compared to setup 1. Nevertheless, treatment III is 
important since it introduces an outside option which is irrelevant for subgame perfect 
equilibrium play. The outside option could serve as an effective punishment for defective 
behaviour, but this punishment threat is non-credible since it involves inflicting harm 
on one-self and fails to be optimal in the moment of its implementation. Therefore, the 
possibility that players can choose whether or not to play the prisoner's dilemma seems of 
no importance since not playing is unattractive relative to mutual defection. However, it 
turns out to matter a lot. As will be seen below, the outside option is used. Furthermore 
subjects use it in order to enhance cooperation. Hypothesis 1 is also corroborated in setup 
Ill. 
This subsection is organized as follows. First it will be explained why the baseline 
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experiment cannot be compared directly to setup Ill. Secondly, evidence for the use of 
the outside option will be provided. Then it will be shown that its use is to increase 
cooperation. The latter is confirmed by showing similarities in cooperation patterns in 
setup II and Ill. 
Why setup I and III are not comparable 
A direc~ compCf.rison with setup III would be misleading due to the difference in the 
payoff matrices: apart from the defect-defect payoff differing in magnitude, it differs in 
sign, which is the major problem. In both setups, mutual defection in all periods is the 
subgame perfect equilibrium; however, while playing the SPE leads to losses in setup I, 
subjects in setup III get a constant, small but secure reward. The incentive to risk coop-
eration is therefore reduced considerably. The following example illustrates why. 
In the worst case a player who always defects gets ten times the defective payoff d. 
Imagine that in the case of mutual cooperation the endeffect would strike in period 9. 
Also suppose it were mutual23 • How high has the probability p that a player responds to 
a cooperative first move in the next period to be for a risk neutral player to consider this 
cooperative first move to be worthwhile? The incentive constraint with d = 1=1, l = -6 
and c = 5 is as follows. 
10d < l + p(7c+ 2d) + (1 - p)(l + 8d) 
which requires p > !~ for the baseline experiment while p > ~ is required in setup Ill. 
Clearly the latter probability is considerably higher (more than double). Thus the incen-
tive to start cooperation is lower. 
Moreover, former research has found considerable psychological differences in how 
gains and losses are conceived. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) show that people tend to 
have a loss-aversion, i.e. they dislike losses more than they like equal-sized gains. The 
authors also observe the phenomenon of reflection: people avoid risks that can yield gains 
but often seek risks to avoid equal-sized losses. 
These results from individual choice find their game-theoretic cousin in different prin-
ciples of loss avoidance. In its most general form, the principle states that people choose 
strategies that might result in gains and expect others to do the same. Cachon and Camerer 
(1996) find substantial evidence for the use of this principle in experiments on coordina-
tion games. For our setup the variance of loss avoidance which Cachon and Camerer 
23These assumptions are made because they correspond to the break-down period of cooperation in 
the non-subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of setup Ill. 
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(1996) refer to as losing-equilibrium avoidance is of interest: subjects avoid strategies 
with negative equilibrium payo£i24 • While in the baseline experiment, the sure loss of the 
subgame perfect equilibrium might be avoided by risking cooperation, in setup III a sure 
gain is put under risk once subjects move away from sub game perfection. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that lower cooperation levels are observed in setup III than in setup I. (see 
Figure 4) 
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0, 4 *_--------
0,1 
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------::~ ~------+------' 
o ~--~-----+----~~----+-----~-----4------~----~----~ : : 
if) <.0 r--. co en 0 
"D -0 "D "D "D 
C 
.g C .g C -0 ;:: .~ .~ 0 
a;. Q.> IV .~ 
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a. 
-11- baseline --0---- setup II -+- setup III 
Figure 4: 
The use of the outside option in setup III 
The evidence below shows that the outside option does not turn out to be irrelevant 
because it is used and its use does not disappear and sometime even increases over time. 
18 out of 21 subjects exited at some point during the experiment. Figures 5 and 6 
show the percentage of all relationships per supergame, and per player in which some 
opting out occurred. In the latter case the overall experiment is contrasted with the last 
5 supergames only. It can be seen that for ~ of the subjects the number of relationships 
affected by the outside option did not diminish or even increased over time. 
In the light of the above numbers the importance of the outside option cannot be 
denied given that its use is weakly dominated. 
24Cachon and Camerer examine games with multiple equilibria whereas I use the principle also in 
situation with only one equilibrium. 
17 
1 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
0,6 
0,5 
0,4 
0,3 
0,2 
0,1 
0 
1 
% relationships where outside option used when 
worse 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
supergame 
10 
-- session 1 -0--- session 2 -~.~- session 3 ~ total 
U') 
1 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
IO,6 
U') 
.§ 0,5 
-0 0 ~ ,4 
0,3 
0,2 
0,1 
Figure 5: 
% number of relationships affected by opting out 
when worse 
o ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
subject 
• % out in all 0 % last 5 out 
Figure 6: 
Non-subgame perfect equilibrium play 
The outside option is used systematically in order to sustain cooperation. Both non-
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subgame perfect equilibria mentioned in Section 2.3 occur. The use of the outside option 
serves two purposes: 
1. severe punishment for defection 
As explained in Section 2.3. cooperation can be sustained till period 8 (inclusive) 
by threatening eternal punishment via exit. Since in equilibrium this threat is not 
implemented, it cannot be assessed directly how much cooperation arose due to its 
existence25. Its impact is seen indirectly when examining endeffect behaviour. If 
the above equilibrium is relevant, cooperation should not break down before period 
9. If it does, it should give rise to self-inflicted punishment via exit. Indeed 
Observation 4 The actual endeffect period of the third experimental setup lies 
above the one in the baseline treatmenf6. 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test rejects the hypothesis Ho of the same end effect 
period in favour of the alternative hypothesis HI that the endeffect period of the 
third experimental setup lies above the baseline experiment. At a significance level 
a = 0.05 the probability that Ho is true is p = 0.0217 (for underlying data see 
Appendix El). 
Moreover, 11 out of 41 cases of too early end effect behaviour were punished by 
exiting27. 
2. signal for cooperative intentions 
The Nash equilibrium that allows for mutual cooperation is based on the threat of 
self-inflicted punishment, which is fairly weak. One way to increase the credibility 
of the threat is to opt out in the first period and to start to cooperate in the second. 
It is easily seen that opting out in the first period, followed by mutual cooperation 
until period 8 inclusive, and mutual defection afterwards, is a N ash equilibrium 
sustained by the now more credible background threat of quitting28. Opting out in 
early periods of a supergame serves as an equilibrium selection device. It reveals 
that the player in question is willing to use self-inflicted punishment. Moreover, 
opting out is a less costly signal for cooperative intentions than cooperation itself29. 
25exit after first period defection is common, but eternal exit is rare (il). 
26In this case the comparision with the baseline experiment is justified since the two games have the 
same subgame perfect equilibrium. 
27If we separate the different experimental sessions, it was used with frequency 1 in session 1, ~ in 
session 2 and ~ in session 3. Averaging over the sessions yields a frequency of 178. 
28Formally, neC + (9 - ne)d ~ h + (ne - l)c. 
290nly subjects who are willing to risk a cooperative first move opted out in early periods. 
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7 out of 21 experimental subjects used and understood this signal. In the first 
experimental session, nearly all the cooperation arose out of this behaviour3o • 
To sum up, the outside option is used, and the data reflects a positive effect of the 
existence of the outside option on cooperation levels. 
Comparison with setup 11 
Since the use of the outside option mainly affects per period cooperation levels obser-
vation 5 further confirms hypothesis 1. 
Observation 5 Per period cooperation levels have the same distributional shape in setup 
11 and Ill. 
In order to test this we rank the observations in both experimental setups according 
to the degree of cooperativeness. The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient accepts 
observation 5 at significance level a = 0.0005 (r=0.9758). The cooperation patterns of 
setup Il and III are identical. 
The higher cooperation levels of setup Il compared to setup III (see Figure 4) were 
expected before running the experiments and are easily explained. First of all setup Il has 
the same prisoner's dilemma matrix than setup I and therefore higher incentives to move 
away from mutual defection. Secondly, in setup Il the outside option is not irrelevant for 
subgame perfect equilibrium play. Therefore its impact is stronger. However, the results 
of setup III seem more interesting because they emphasize the importance of whether or 
not interactions are voluntary, since this turns out to matter even in the case when theory 
predicts its irrelevance. 
The experiment clearly shows that voluntary interaction structures might be a key 
element in explaining observed cooperation levels in real data. The willingness to interact 
when there exists an option not to do so is based on the belief that the interaction is 
worthwhile. In setup Il this can only be the case for both game partners if they cooper-
ate. The way cooperation is reached confirms further the sophistication of experimental 
subjects; in particular the use of the outside option in setup III to signal cooperative 
intentions reveals how highly imaginative subjects are and that they continuously search 
for a better strategy. 
30100% cooperation was due to signalling by opting out from supergame 6 onwards. 
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4.3 Subgame perfect play in experimental setup 11 
This subsection examines a minor point which is of interest because it serves to illustrate 
the difference in subgame perfect play in setup Il and III and it relates the present 
experiments to existing experiments with an exit option. 
While the outside option in the setup III is weakly dominated, in setup Il it is strictly 
dominant and constitutes the subgame perfect equilibrium path. 
Observation 6 The subgame perfect strategy of never entering a game is hardly ever 
observed. This stands in sharp contrast to the number of occurrences of the subgame 
perfect equilibrium of always defect in experimental setups I and Ill. 
Only one subject stopped playing completely31. Two more subjects played the sub-
game perfect equilibrium in some relationships in early supergames but stopped once they 
had learned the possibility of mutual cooperation. Compared to setup I and III (see figure 
2) but also to one-shot experiments as conducted by Orbell et al. (1993) this percentage 
of subgame perfect equilibrium play is very low. Why does this result of the one-shot 
game not extend to the finitely repeated game? 
Orbell et al. (1993) interpret their results in lines with the false consensus literature. 
They hypothesize that the choice whether or not to exist is determined by the subject's 
intention how to play the prisoner's dilemma. People are supposed to project their own 
intentions onto others and expect others to behave like themselves. Given the payoff 
matrix, an experimental subject exits if and only if he expects defective play. Subgame 
perfect play is mainly due to intending defectors. Cooperation levels increase because 
intending cooperators are observed to exit much less frequently than intending defectors. 
In the multiple game situation subgame perfect play is rare for the following reasons: 
payoff incentives are such that it pays to enter for somebody who intends to defect always 
as long as he believes that at least one player will make a cooperative move. The section 
on divergence behaviour showed that purely defective intentions are exceptional. More-
over, although the experimental subjects could project their own probabilities of their 
different behavioural rules onto others, the present setup allows for an additional predic-
tor concerning future play; given that it is known that the set of experimental subjects 
is the same in all supergames, each subject can built up some well-founded beliefs about 
the average behaviour of his potential game partners. This "reputation effect" ensures 
that the past discovery of one cooperator is sufficient to destroy future sub game perfect 
play. 
31The subject explained that the only possible outcome in the game is mutual defection which is worse 
than staying out. 
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5 Not learning by not doing 
We have argued that experimental subjects are very sophisticated. They discriminate 
in order to learn and constantly search for a better strategy. Past errors are corrected 
quickly. Experimental setup II presents an observation which seems to reveal the opposite: 
! of the subjects fail to learn not to enter the last period of a supergame32 • But strikingly, 
this observation does not carry over to the other experimental setups in which players 
learn not to reverse tbeir play after the endeffect has occurred.33 How can this failure to 
learn be reconciled with the postulated sophistication of experimental subjects? 
Hypothesis 3 Not learning by not doing: (Inconsequentiality of last period entry) 
Choosing to enter the game in the last period in setup 11 has a consequence only if both 
players do so. As only very few of the last period game entries actually lead to a match, 
experimental subjects are not aware of the negative consequences of their entering the 
game34 • 
Subjects who fail to learn not to enter in the last period of the supergame enter only 
sporadically. Rather than endangering our postulate of sophisticated behaviour, this con-
firms the hypothesis that experimental subjects work like classifier systems. Due to its 
sporadic nature last period entry has no consequences, therefore it is neither discour-
aged nor reinforced. Moreover, players who enter the game in the last period of later 
supergames normally do not play in preceding periods. This makes mutual last period 
entry unlikely, hence any rule recommending entry in the last period after periods of in-
activity will be triggered with positive probability since it neither benefits nor harms the 
player. 
In appendix F tables for each subject's behaviour in the last period can be found. 
The table lists how many times a subject entered the last period in each supergame, how 
many of these entries were justified35 , how many directly followed former exit periods and 
32Notice that the only rational outcome of last period entry is mutual defection 
33In the third experimental setup, only 4 subjects play once cooperatively after the endeffect has 
occurred. This implies that in general, players understand right from the beginning the consequences 
of the endeffect. In the baseline experiment, one experimental subject (subject 11) did not even learn 
endeffect behaviour. He only learned never to cooperate in period 10. 2 players never entered a cooperative 
relationships. 5 subjects never played cooperatively after the endeffect, 6 subjects only once in the first 
five supergames. The remaining 7 subjects tried to reverse the endeffect in some later supergame in which 
the endeffect had occurred relatively soon (period 4 to 8). 
34 A similar phenomenon is observed in experiments on second price auctions. The dominant strategy 
argument is not learned, since bidding above once own price does not incur any loss if one does not get 
the object (c.f. J. Kagel and D. Levin (1993)). 
35Due to a cooperative relationship or a defect-cooperate result in period 9. 
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failed attempts to enter by the player, how many actually lead to a game, and the points 
resulting from this game. 
Table IV summarizes the overall learning behaviour. It displays how many subjects 
failed to learn or learned only in the last supergames and the underlying reasons. 
no learning delayed learning learning 
total 7 4 10 
positive total points 2 1 
no game in 10 4 3 
no game in <10 6 3 
no explanation 1 0 
Table IV 
The behaviour of all but one subject can indeed be explained by hypothesis 3. The 
failure to learn does not make experimental subjects less sophisticated since it only occurs 
when it has no consequence. In setup I and III subjects do learn the theoretical right 
move in the last period since the consequences are immediate. 
6 Conclusion 
The present paper has addressed two separated issues: (i) how good or harmful are certain 
behavioural assumption like the existence of player types and certain rules of thumb or 
learning schemes that allow agents to make eternal consistent errors? (ii) what is the 
importance of voluntary versus involuntary interaction structures in the finite prisoner's 
dilemma? 
The experiments conducted to examine these issues allow us to draw the following 
conclusions: (i) player types do not exist. Experimental subjects turn out to be sophis-
ticated in their use of different strategies and do not make consistent errors. (ii) partner 
selection enhances cooperation and thus might be a key element in explaining high co-
operation levels in real data. For the analysis of the prisoner's dilemma this suggests 
that situations with and without partner selection have to be distinguished carefully and 
that any fixed type models in order to explain cooperation are not founded on human 
behaviour. Moreover, fixed type models might result in very wrong learning dynamics 
in the game. The implication for economic modelling in general is that any reasonable 
model has to recognize the sophistication of agents and allow them to avoid consistent 
errors. Recently, some authors have called for the need to impose certain" consistency" 
or "quasi-rationality" requirements on behavioural rules used by agents to avoid using 
learning schemes that cause agents to make the same mistakes forever (see e.g. Evans 
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and Ramey (1994), Brock and Hommes (1995), Fudenberg and Levin (1995), Marcet and 
Nicolini (1995)). The present experiments confirm that such consistency conditions are 
an important ingredient in describing agents' behaviour in the laboratory. 
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A Statistical tests used 
To test the hypotheses 5 different tools from nonparametric statistics were used which 
shall be explained below. Siegel and Castellan (1988) served as the basis. 
• The binomial test 
This test can only be used if the data can be seen as a binary population, i.e. falls 
into two discrete categories36 • The null hypothesis is that the two categories occur 
with equal probability. The probability that the actual number of cases falling into 
one of the categories is at most as big as the observed number is calculated under 
this hypothesis. If this probability is less than a significance level Cl! Ho is rejected . 
• The Wilcoxon-Mann- Whitney test 
This test serves to examine whether two independent samples have been drawn from 
the same population. It works as follows: let m be the number of observations from 
sample X and n be the number of observations from sample Y. The observations 
of both samples are combined and ranked according to algebraic size, starting from 
the lowest values. Then the sum of the ranks for each groups is calculated. If these 
sums lie to far apart, the hypothesis of equal distribution is rejected. 
36My categories are confirming or not confirming to a certain behavioural pattern. 
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• The robust rank order test 
This test also examines whether the median of two independent samples is the same. 
Unlike the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test it does not require the same underlying 
distribution. The test is performed as follows. The observations in the two samples 
are ordered from the smallest to the biggest. Then for each observation of the first 
sample X, the number of observations of the second sample Y with a lower rank 
are counted. It is called the placement of X and denoted by U(Y Xi). Similarly, the 
placement of Y is U(XYi). Then the mean (U(XY) and U(YX)) and the variability 
Vx and Vy of the mean of the placements is calculated with 
m 
Vx = 2]U(YXi ) - U(YX)]2 
i=1 
n 
Vy = IJU(XYi) - U(Xy)]2 
;=1 
with m and n being the total number of observation from the first and second sample 
respectively. The test statistic is 
U = mU(YX) - nU(XY) 
2JVx + Vy + U(XY)U(Y X) 
• The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient 
This coefficient reveals the association between two variables that are at least mea-
surable on ordinal scales. It is based on the idea that the difference di between the 
ranks of the two variables indicates their disparity. If there are no ties in the data 
it is calculated as 
where N is the number of observations of each variable. If there are ties in the data, 
each observation is assigned the average of the ranks that would have been assigned 
in the absence of ties. If there are many ties, the coefficient has to be corrected and 
is calculated as 
where x = X - X, i.e. the observed rank minus the mean. Similarly, y = Y - Y. 
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B Cooperation 
B.1 Percentage cooperation per supergame 
1 11 
~uP1ergame 2 
setup session 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.2214 0.2429 0.3167 0.3452 0.5214 0.6405 0.6357 0.6857 0.6619 0.6524 
I 2 0.2214 0.2119 0.2619 0.3 0.3310 0.4214 0.3129 0.3929 0.4238 0.3881 
3 0.2595 0.1429 0.1643 0.1976 0.2214 0.3905 
average 0.2341 0.1192 0.2476 0.2810 0.3679 0.4841 0.475 0.5393 0.5429 0.5202 
1 0.4444 0.5940 0.4658 0.5882 0.5234 0.5728 0.5921 0.6652 0.6598 0.6327 
11 2 0.1734 0.0945 0.18 0.1512 0.1512 0.5128 0.2255 0.5 0.3846 0.3810 
3 0.5405 0.8203 0.8532 0.7569 0.7820 0.7460 0.7232 0.7023 0.6277 0.5902 
average 0.3947 0.5707 0.5550 0.5760 0.5722 0.6169 0.5536 0.6236 0.5773 0.5484 
1 0.1152 0.0783 0.0624 0.0634 0.1069 0.2087 0.2568 0.2630 0.2356 0.1709 
III 2 0.1070 0.0597 0.0719 0.0487 0.1143 0.1695 0.2611 0.3 0.2798 0.1105 
3 0.1053 0.0106 0.0732 0.0941 0.1589 0.4338 0.5082 0.5043 0.4533 0.4247 
average 0.1091 0.0495 0.0692 0.0687 0.1267 0.2707 0.3421 0.3558 0.3229 0.2354 
Table V 
B.2 Total cooperation levels per period 
type I setup 11-1 p;;....e_~_o_d_-2---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---10-
I 0.3619 0.3690 0.4047 0.4569 0.4524 0.4460 0.4093 0.3810 0.2042 
total 11 0.4428 0.5134 0.5730 0.6337 0.6804 0.7197 0.6505 0.5089 0.4033 
III 0.1129 0.1616 0.1736 0.1860 0.1869 0.2002 0.1960 0.1661 0.1069 
I 0.3619 0.3690 0.4047 0.4293 0.4275 0.4235 0.3917 0.3661 0.200 
per session 11 0.4013 0.4608 0.5157 0.5648 0.6052 0.6312 0.5720 0.4610 0.3561 
I 0.3860 0.3935 0.4282 0.4293 0.4275 0.4235 0.3917 0.3661 0.2002 
per player 11 0.3999 0.4426 0.4936 0.5164 0.5455 0.5489 0.4905 0.4002 0.3259 
III 0.1113 0.1624 0.1735 0.1843 0.1847 0.1993 0.1942 0.1661 0.1075 
Table VI 
From table VI it can be seen that in the baseline treatment, total cooperation starts 
to decrease by period 4 while in setup 11 it only starts falling in period 6. Furthermore, 
cooperation levels increase less and fall more strongly in the baseline treatment. 
B.3 Percentage of cooperative relationships 
In experimental setup 11, I distinguish between the percentage of cooperative relationships 
out of active ones referred to as lI(active) and the percentage of cooperative relationships 
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0.0586 
0.2871 
0.0573 
0.0629 
0.2340 
0.0629 
0.2168 
0.0595 
out of all possible partnerships. 
supergames 
setup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I 0.0635 0.1429 0.1905 0.2857 0.3968 0.5397 0.5714 0.6905 0.6905 
I1(active) 0.3636 0.5625 0.6000 0.6667 0.5806 0.8077 0.7692 0.8462 0.7667 
11 (all) 0.1905 0.2857 0.2381 0.2857 0.2857 0.3333 0.3175 0.3492 0.3651 
III 0 0.0317 0.0476 0.0794 0.1270 0.2698 0.3175 0.3333 0.2857 
Table VII 
C Mixing and divergence behaviour 
~ of the subjects do not converge while 281 continue mixing. The exact numbers per setup 
are summarized in the following two tables. "No divergence" (no mixing) means that the 
subject never diverged (mixed) in any supergame. "Partial convergence" (partial stop) 
describes convergence (no mixing) over several supergames with a return to diverging 
(mixing) behaviour. 
setup no divergence convergence partial convergence no convergence total 
I 5 10 2 4 21 
II 3 9 0 9 21 
III 2 13 0 6 21 
Table VIII 
setup no mixing stop mixing partial stop mixing total 
I 4 11 1 6 21 
II 0 7 2 12 21 
III 2 8 5 6 21 
Table IX 
The proportion of subjects that diverged (mixed) in each supergame are represented 
below37 • 
37The different denominator is due to some missing observations in setup I from supergame 8 onwards 
due to a network breakdown during the last experimental session. 
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10 
0.6905 
0.7407 
0.3175 
0.2540 
proportion of mixing subjects 
supergames 
setup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I 34 22 22 12 18 16 18 15 15 16 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
II 20 18 17 18 17 15 13 10 13 13 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
III 13 .§.. ~ 4 8 8 8 9 10 10 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Table X 
proportion of diverging subjects 
supergames 
setup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I 26 10 10 6 8 8 6 3 9 12 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
II 18 14 14 13 11 12 13 12 11 9 21 12 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
III 15 3 5 3 5 7 7 7 8 6 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Table XI 
Table XII displays how often divergence and mixing did not go hand in hand. 
setup 11 convergence but mixing stop mixing but divergence I total 
I 
11 
3 0 3 
II 3 1 4 
III 3 3 6 
Table XII 
D Percentage of only defective play in experimental 
setup I and III 
type 
I 11 supergrunes 
setup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
one-sided I 0.1587 0.4762 0.4206 0.4603 0.3968 0.3016 0.2738 0.2024 0.1786 
III 0.3254 0.7381 0.7778 0.7857 0.7540 0.5794 0.5476 0.5238 0.4841 
mutual I 0.0476 0.2540 0.2381 0.3333 0.2698 0.2222 0.2143 0.1429 0.1190 
III 0.1111 0.6190 0.6667 0.6984 0.6508 0.4921 0.4286 0.4127 0.3651 
Table XIII 
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10 
0.2143 
0.5238 
0.1667 
0.4762 
E Endeffect behaviour 
E.1 Actual (observed) endeffect period 
supergames 
setup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I 9.25 8.7 9.3333 9.5294 8.8 9.2059 8.375 8.2222 7.75 7.8276 
II 10.8182 10.25 9.8667 9.6667 9.1667 8,4286 8.05 7.7727 7.5417 7.15 
III 9.5 10.3333 10.2 10 10 9.45 9.2174 7.9473 7.6471 
Table XIV 
E.2 Intended endeffect period 
The intended endeffect period is the period in which an experimental subject intend to 
break up the cooperative relationship. This period cannot always be observed directly, 
but is easily inferable from the subjects' detailed statements and their overall endeffect 
behaviour. The intended endeffect period reveals when a subject considers it worth-
while to break up a cooperative relationship. Mixing behaviour in this period is very 
common38. A shift of the endeffect to earlier periods ought to be reflected in intended 
endeffect periods. The hypothesis that the endeffect period is negatively correlated with 
the number of the supergame is supported in all three experimental setups39. Table XV 
shows the mean and standard deviation of intended deviation period in end-effect plays 
for supergames and experimental sessions separately. It also shows the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between the mean40 of the intended deviation period and the num-
ber of the supergame. The values in brackets refer to the one-tailed and two-tailed level 
of significance respectively. 
38Tables on intended and observed endeffect periods of each subjects can be obtained from the author 
upon request. 
39Selten and Stoecker (1986) get slightly higher correlation coefficients. However, they look for corre-
lation from supergame 13 onwards while I start with the first supergame. 
40If players had different endeffect periods with different partners they were averaged in the calculation 
of the mean. 
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experimental Supergames Spearman rank 
session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 correlation coefficient 
baseline I 
mean 10.875 10.125 9.9 9.44 9.239 9.47 9.407 9.24 8.314 8.29 -0.903 
standard dev. 0.217 1.023 0.49 0.46 0.25 0.75 0.628 0.603 0.757 0.683 (0.0005) (0.001) 
baseline 11 
mean 11 9.5 10.33 10 9.7 9.61 7.56 8.875 9.42 8.83 -0.794 
standard dev. 0 1.47 0.47 0.63 0.871 0.45 2.307 1.078 0.607 1.344 (0.005) (0.01) 
baseline III 
mean 10 9.75 9.77 9.45 9.55 -0.8 
standard dev 0.829 0.696 1.487 0.748 (0.1) (0.2) 
better I 
mean 10.6 10 10 9.3 9.4 8.3 7.96 8.17 8.13 7.3 -0.96 
standa.r<i dev. 0.49 0.894 0.707 0.56 0.8 1.599 1.80 1.07 0.39 0.417 (0.0005) (0.001) 
better 11 
mean 11 10 10 10.33 9 9 8.67 7.67 -0.9157 
standard dev. 0 0 0.47 0 0 0.47 1.88 (0.0025) (0.005) 
better III 
mean 11 10.83 10.42 10.03 9.4 8.7 8.08 7.84 7.21 7.667 -0.994 
standard dev. 0 0.37 0.449 0.58 0.447 0.5 0.61 1.32 0.74 0.408 (0.0005) (0.001) 
worse I 
mean 9.17 10 9.5 9.5 9.5 9 8.5 -0.891 
standard dev. 0.63 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 (0.01) (0.02) 
worse 11 
mean 11 11 11 11 10.8 11 10.8 10 9.67 -0.844 
standard dev. 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.4 0.89 0.47 (0.0025) (0.005) 
worse III 
mean 10.333 10.667 10.25 10.12 9.07 8.82 7.98 7.357 -0.976 
standard dev. 0.4714 0.4714 0.433 0.33 0.678 0.437 0.846 0.58 (0.0005) (0.001) 
Table XV 
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F Last period entries setup 11 
player activity sgl sg2 sg3-]· sg4-1 sgS sg6 sg7 sg8 -I .sg9 sg10 
yes 3 I> 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
justfied 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 after no 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
games 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
points I> -2 -6 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
yes 4 3 5 4 2 3 3 3 4 0 
justified 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 after no 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-after yes-no 2 2 2 3 '2 3 3 3 4 0 
games 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
points 0 -1 -2 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
r--3~ ye. 11 1 2 0 11 10=1*0 I 0 0 0 justified 2 0 1 0 ~0 0 0 0 
--
yes 3 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
justified 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 after no 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
games 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
points -2 -3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
yes 4 6 5 6 0 6 0 0 0 1 
justified 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I> after no 0 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 1 
after yes-no 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
games 3 I> 3 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
points 4 -7 1 -6 0 7 0 0 0 0 
yes 6 6 6 6 2 6 6 1 6 6 
justified 1 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
6 after no 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 6 
after yes-no 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 6 0 
games 2 3 3 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 
points 4 I> -3 I> -7 -1 -1 0 0 -1 
yes 4 0 4 6 2 3 1 3 1 1 
justified 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 after no 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 
after yes-no 1 0 0 I> 1 3 0 0 0 0 
games 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 
points I> 0 6 -2 0 -1 -1 0 0 -1 
yes 2 f 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 
justified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 after no 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 
after yes-no 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 
games 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
points -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 
ye. 4 3 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 6 
justified 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9 after no 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
after yes-no 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
games 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 
points -2 4 -1 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0 -2 
yes 0 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 
justified 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
10 after no 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
games 0 2 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 
points 0 I> -1 -2 -1 6 0 0 0 0 
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player activity sgl sg2 sg3 sg4 sgl> sg6 sg7 sg8 sg9 sg10 
11 yes o o 000 0 000 o 
yes 6 3 1 3 1 1 0 2 2 1 
justified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 after no 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
after yes-no 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 
games 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
points -2 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
yes 3 2 1 6 li 2 0 1 1 3 
justified 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
13 after no 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 2 0 0 4 3 0 0 1 1 3 
games 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
points -1 0 0 -'2 -1 -6 0 () G 0 
yes 3 3 2 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 
justified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 alter no 0 2 1 4 3 0 2 4 0 0 
after yes-no 3 0 1 2 1 6 2 2 5 5 
games 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 
points 0 -1 0 -2 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 
yes 6 4 4 0 4 3 0 6 6 0 
justified 1 4 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
15 after no 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 
games 2 4 4 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 
points 4 28 4 0 -2 -2 0 -1 -2 0 
yes 5 6 4 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 
justified 5 5 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
16 after no 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
games 4 5 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 
points 20 14 12 6 -3 0 0 0 0 0 
yes 3 4 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 
justified 3 4 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 
17 after no 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
games 3 4 4 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 
points 15 9 8 3 -2 6 0 0 0 0 
yes 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 
after DO 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 
18 after yes-no 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
games 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
points -1 -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 
yes 3 3 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
justified 3 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 after DO 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
games 3 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
points 15 9 -1 -7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
yes 6 6 3 1 2 6 2 6 6 6 
justified 1 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
20 after no 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 
after yes-no 3 3 0 0 0 1 2 5 5 5 
games 1 2 3 0 0 3 1 2 1 0 
points -1 -1 -3 0 0 -8 -1 -2 -1 0 
yes 3 3 6 3 4 3 0 1 1 0 
justified 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
21 after no 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
after yes-no 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
games 3 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 
points 15 4 -7 6 -3 -1 0 0 0 0 
Table XVI 
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G Instrucciones 
G.l Introduccion 
Este es un experimento de toma de decisiones. Las instrucciones son simples y, si las 
sigues y las aplicas con atencion, puedes ganar unas pesetas. Te damos 1000 pesetas para 
empezar. Conseguiras aumentar 0 disminuir est a suma en funcion de tus decisiones a 
10 largo del experimBnto. Si pierdes mar de esta sum a inicial, no ganaras nada ..... y, por 
supuesto, no nos tendras que pagar nada. 
G.2 Contenido de una sesion 
• Sesion 
- una sesion esta compuesta por diez pedodos 
- hay siete participantes en cada sesion 
- durante la sesion cada participante esta identificado por un numero, del 1 al 
7, que sera elegido al azar 
- este numero sera tu identificacion durante los diez perfodos de la sesion 
• Decisiones 
En cada perfodo tienes que tomar dos decisiones 
1. La primera decision es la de elegir a las personas con las cuales quieres em-
parejarte en el experimento. Puedes elegir desde ninguna hasta un m8.ximo de 
seis personas. Cada participante tomara esta decision simultaneamente. 
Cuando todo el mundo haya tornado esta decision, se te informara de quienes 
van a ser tus parejas. Una pareja se forma cuando dos participantes se eligen 
mutuamente. Por 10 tanto, puedes tener de cero a seis parejas. 
2. Tu segunda decision sera la de elegir una acci6n para cada pareja que tengas. 
- en cada caso puedes escoger entre dos acciones diferentes a y b, al igual 
que tu pareja. 
- tu y tu pareja teneis que decidir simultaneamente que accion quereis tomar 
sin saber la decision del otro. 
- como solo podeis escoger entre a y b, hay cuatro combinaciones de acciones 
posibles. La tabla siguiente describe los puntos que consigues en cada una 
de ellas. 
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I tu decision Ila decision de tu pareja 1 tus puntos Ilos puntos de tu pareja 1 
a a 1 1 
a b 7 -6 
b a -6 7 
b b 5 5 
La tabla se interpreta como sigue: 
* cuando eliges la accion a y tu pareja elige la accion a, tu consigues 1 
punto y tu pareja consigue 1 punto 
* cuando eliges la accion a y tu pareja elige la accion b, tu consigues 7 
puntos y tu pareja consigue -6 punt os 
* cuando eliges la accion by tu pareja elige la accion a, tu consigues -6 
puntos y tu pareja consigue 7 puntos 
* cuando eliges la accion b y tu pareja elige la accion b, tu consigues 5 
puntos y tu pareja consigue 5 puntos 
* si no estas emparejado con un participante, consigues 0 punt os y este 
participante consigue 0 punt os 
G.3 Repeticion de la sesion 
Tal como hemos dicho, durante una sesion (10 periodos) cada participante esta identificado 
por un numero. Durante estos 10 periodos tienes que tomar las decisiones descritas 
anteriormente. En cuanto hayas terminado los 10 periodos, te sera asignado un nuevo 
numero de identificacion, elegido al azar, que estara vigente durante una segunda sesion 
de diez periodos, durante la cual tienes que repetir el procedimiento descrito arriba. En 
total habra diez sesiones de 10 perfodos con un nuevo numero de identificacion en cada 
sesion. 
G.4 Ganancias 
Las 10 sesiones se dividen en dos grupos de 5 sesiones cada uno. Las ganancias que 
recibiras se calcularan como sigue: 
1. Se eligiran aleatoriamente 2 sesiones, una perteneciente a cada uno de 10s grupos 
antes mencionados. La probabilidad de seleccionar una sesion, dado el grupo a que 
pertence, es igual a k. Te conviene, por 10 tanto, jugar bien en todas y cada una de 
las sesiones porque 2 de ell as seran elegidas para calcular tus ganancias finales. 
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2. Los punt os obtenidos en las sesiones elegidas se convertinin en pesetas. Un punto 
equivale a 15 pesetas; de tal modo que, por ejemplo, 50 puntos equivalen a 750 
pesetas. 
3. 'IUs ganancias finales seran las ganancias/perdidas obtenidas mas la cantidad fija 
por participar (1000 pesetas). 
G.S El uso del ordenador 
G.S.l Las dos decisiones 
1. elegir a tu pareja 
Para tu primera decision el ordenador proyectara una pantalla pidit~ndote que in-
diques con quiEm quieres emparejarte. Te comunicara tambien tu numero de identi-
ficacion, el periodo en el cual est as y el total de los puntos que has conseguido en la 
sesion hasta ese momento. Tienes que contestar utilizando y (yes) para elegir una 
pareja y n (no) para rechazarla. Un ejemplo de pantalla: 
1234567 
oferta x 
La x debajo de 1 significa que eres participante 1. Como no puedes emparejarte 
contigo mismo, no te deja espacio debajo dell. En la fila oferta tienes que responder 
si quieres emparejarte 0 no con cada participante. Para ello tienes que saltar al 
campo que quieres modificar utilizando las Hechas de los cursores. Una vez que 
estes en el campo, puis a ENTER, escribe tu respuesta - y 0 n - y puis a ENTER de 
nuevo. Date cuenta de que tienes que pulsar ENTER dos veces. 
Cuando hayas tornado todas las decisiones, pulsa FlO para comunicarlas. Una vez 
pulsado FlO, tus decisiones son irreversibles. Asf pues, asegurate de que has escrito 
10 que querfas escribir antes de pulsar F10. 
2. elegir tu accion 
Cada vez que tienes que elegir una accion, el ordenador proyectara la tabla de puntos 
que las diferentes combinaciones de acciones reportan. Te comunicara tambh~n tus 
parejas, utilizando la estructura de la tabla siguiente 
1234567 
pareja x 
accion x 
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La x en la fila pareja significa que eres participante 1 en el ejemplo. La linea pareja 
indica las parejas que hayan resultado de tu primera decision. Si hay una n debajo 
de un numero, esto significa que no estas emparejado con ese participante. Si hay 
una y tienes entonces que llenar el campo vado en la fila accion, elegiendo entre ay 
b. La tabla siguiente muestra todas las combinaciones posibles que pueden ocurrir. 
123 
pareja x n y 
accion x x 
Observa que solo en el ultimo caso tienes que tomar una decision. Para escribir una 
decision, salta al campo que quieres modificar utilizando las fiechas, pulsa ENTER, 
escribe tu decision y puIs a ENTER de nuevo. Acuerdate que puedes elegir acciones 
diferentes con diferentes parejas. Cuando hayas tornado todas las decisiones puIs a 
FlO para confirmar y continuar. 
jAtencion! En el caso de que no tengas ninguna pareja, tienes tambien que pulsar 
FIO. No 10 olvides 0 haras esperar a todos inutilmente. 
G.5.2 Historia 
Despues de cada periodo el ordenador te dira los resultados del periodo anterior y te 
mostrara la historia del experimento. La siguiente tabla te muestra los resultados posibles 
que pueden aparecer en la historia y como interpretarlos. 
per 
1 o\a 
pun 
1 
xxx 
00 
2 
nxx 
00 
3 
yxx 
00 
4 5 
yaa yab 
1 1 7-6 
6 7 
yba ybb 
-67 55 
per significa periodo, 0 of er ta, a la accion elegida y pun los puntos recibidos. Eres 
participante 1. Detras de o\a el ordenador te dice si has hecho una oferta(y\n), la accion 
que tomaste y la accion que tomo tu pareja. x indica que no estas emparejado con este 
participante. pun te comunica los puntos que tu y tu pareja habeis recibido. Los puntos 
son 0, si no estais emparejados. 
En los primeros tres cas os no has tenido pareja: en el primer caso porque no puedes 
emparejarte contigo mismo, en el segundo porque tu no querias la pareja y en el tercero 
porque el otro no queria ser tu pareja. 
En los cuatro casos que quedan tienes pareja y, por ello, aparecen tus acciones, las 
acciones de tu pareja y los puntos conseguidos en la tabla. 
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Puedes consultar la historia cada vez que tengas que tomar una decisi6n 0 que estes 
esperando a que los demas tomen sus decisiones. S6lo tienes que pulsar las teclas corre-
spondientes. FI te mostrara la historia de la primera sesi6n, F2 la de la segunda, F3 la 
de la tercera, F4la de la cuarta, F5 la de la quinta, F6 la de la sexta, F7la de la septima, 
F8 la de la octava, F9 la de la novena y q la de la decima. 
Si estas consultando la historia no podras darte cuenta de cuando terminan los demas. 
Por ello te pedimos que no dejes la historia abierta si no estas consultandola. Date cuenta 
de que si quieres consultar la historia cuando estas esperando, el ordenador reacciona 
lentamente. Despues de haber pulsado FI 0 F2 0 F3 0 F4 0 F5 0 F6 0 F7 0 F8 0 F9 0 q, 
tardara unos segundos antes de mostrarte la historia. 
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